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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee/Respondent,

:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

:

Case No.
Ct. of Appeals No. 990647-CA
Priority No. 12

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to summarily
reverse Appellant's conviction and instead incorrectly remanding
this case uto the trial court for preparation and approval of xa
statement of evidence or proceedings7" where a transcript of one
full day of trial in a two-day trial is not available.
Preservation.

This issue may be raised for the first time

on appeal since the lack of transcript constitutes exceptional
circumstances which would result in manifest injustice unless
reviewed.

See generally State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255,

1256 (Utah 1996)(reviewing claim raised for first time on appeal
that absence of complete record violated Article I, section 12 of
Utah Constitution).

Petitioner/Appellant Joseph Tunzi

("Petitioner" or "Joseph") raised this issue in the Court of
Appeals by filing a motion for summary reversal.

See Addendum A

containing motion for summary reversal.
Standard of Review.

The underlying issue of whether the

lack of a sufficient transcript to adequately review Joseph's
trial requires a new trial involves a question of law.

See

generally State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah
1983)(concluding that lack of complete transcript required new
trial).

This Court therefore "review[s] for correctness the

legal conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals."

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992).
OPINION BELOW

In response to Joseph's motion for summary reversal, the
Court of Appeals issued an Order of Remand.
is in Addendum B.

A copy of that Order

Joseph petitions this Court for certiorari

review of that order.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
A party may petition for certiorari review of an order of
the Court of Appeals.

Utah R. App. P. 45.

issued its order on November 30, 1999.

The Court of Appeals

This petition for writ of

certiorari is therefore timely.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES AND STATUTES
The text of the following constitutional provisions, rules
and statutes is in Addendum C:
Art.
Art.
Utah
Utah

I, § 12, Utah Const.;
VIII, § 1, Utah Const.;
Code Ann. § 78-56-105 (Supp. 1999);
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996);

J. Admin. R. 4-201.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-602 (1996), the state charged Petitioner with Attempted
Homicide, a second degree felony.

R. 9.

bound Petitioner over for trial.

R. 12.
2

The juvenile court

Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to admit the out of
court statements of Zebulin Smith ("Zeb"), which Petitioner
opposed.

R. 28-34, 80.

A jury trial was held on April 22-23, 1999.

R. 76-77.

The

jury acquitted Joseph of Attempted Homicide, and convicted him of
the lesser charge of Aggravated Assault, which had been requested
by the state.

R. 77, 73, 108.

On June 9, 1999, the trial judge

sentenced Joseph to serve zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison.

R. 117.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and supporting
documents in the trial court.

He also filed a timely docketing

statement, a copy of which is in Addendum D, in the Court of
Appeals.

Issues outlined in the docketing statement were (1)

whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Joseph of
Aggravated Assault, and (2) "[w]hether the trial court erred in
failing to remand the case back to juvenile court."
Addendum D.

See

Counsel for Petitioner thereafter learned that the

Third District Court was unable to locate the videotape of
April 23, 1999, the second day of trial, and that a transcript of
that day of trial is therefore not available.

R. 136, 141:194.

On October 22, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for summary
reversal.

The state requested an extension of time to respond in

order to "try to find the missing part of the record."
Addendum E.

See

Thereafter, the state filed its response, agreeing

that summary reversal was appropriate.
part:
3

The state responded in

Because appellant is asserting that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction, the absence of
a transcript for a full day of the two-day trial makes
appellate review and reconstruction of the record
difficult, if not impossible. See State
v.
Verikokides,
925 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah 1996);
State
v.
Taylor,
664 P.2d 439, 446-47 (Utah 1983). It appears,
therefore, that to preserve appellant's state
constitutional right to appeal, the appropriate remedy
is a new trial. See State
v. Verikokides,
925 P.2d at
1256; Taylor,
664 P.2d at 446-47.
State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Reversal at
1-2; see Addendum F.
Despite the inability to adequately pursue an appeal because
a substantial portion of the record is missing, and the
impracticality and unfairness of requiring the parties to attempt
to recreate all of the testimony and legal discussions which
occurred in a full day of trial held eight months ago, the Court
of Appeals disregarded the state's stipulation of reversal, and
remanded the case for reconstruction of the record.

In so doing,

the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with
decisions of this Court, and has violated Joseph's state
constitutional right to appeal as well as his rights to due
process and equal protection.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO CONVICTION
A transcript of only the first day of trial exists.
day, five witnesses testified.

R. 141:151.

On that

The state also

called Zeb Smith, who invoked his Fifth Amendment protection and
did not testify on that day.

R. 141:151.

None of the witnesses who testified on the first day of
trial identified Joseph as the person who stabbed John ("Rocky")
4

Vigil ("Rocky").

In fact, the only person who identified a

stabber implicated Zeb Smith and indicated that it was not Joseph
who hit Rocky.

R. 141:129.

This incident occurred on Halloween night, 1998.

A party

was going on at a neighbor's house, and Rocky and his friends
were in Rocky 7 s hot tub.

Gilbert Leyba ("Gilbert"), Rocky 7 s

close friend, got out of the hot tub and flirted with some girls
who were at the nearby party.
Petitioner approached.

Shortly thereafter, Zeb and

Rocky and Gilbert got out of the hot tub

and stood at the gate while a verbal altercation occurred.
Zeb was agitated and yelled things at Rocky and Gilbert like
xx

[d]o you want some of

this?"

Rocky responded with things like,

xx

[w]hat are you going to do about it?"

R. 141:105.

Gilbert was standing right next to Rocky when Rocky was stabbed.
Zeb took a few swings at Rocky.

R. 141:105.

According to

Gilbert, Zeb hit Rocky, and it looked as if he hit him in the
neck.

R. 141:105.

Gilbert testified that he saw where Zeb 7 s

blows landed, and he specifically described those blows:
There was a few of them that hit--had hit him in the-in the head and the one specifically, I remember
[Rocky] being punched in the neck, what happened to me
being--because he slouched down right away, had his
hand over his neck and he started to push me back out
of the way and trying to close the gates.
R. 141:105.

Gilbert did not see the knife.

R. 141:105.

Gilbert

consistently testified that he saw Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, and
that it was not Joseph who hit Rocky.

R. 141:129.

Immediately after Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, Rocky held his
neck and tried to push Gilbert out of the way and get the gate
5

closed.

R. 141:106.

When Gilbert and Rocky got back inside

Rocky's house, Rocky lay on the floor and there was a lot of
blood.

R. 141:106.

Blood was coming out of Rocky's neck and he

was making choking sounds; this was when Gilbert realized Rocky
had been stabbed.

R. 141: 106.

After Gilbert called 9-1-1, he went back outside and heard
the girls he had flirted with earlier telling Zeb that he better
leave or he would be charged with murder.

R. 141:13 0.

The girls

were trying to block the license plate of a white car.
R. 141:111.

Zeb got into the car and drove away.

R. 141:111.

Later that evening, Zeb returned to the scene in the white
car.

R. 141:113.

Gilbert "thought it was crazy for him to come

back, 'cause after what [Gilbert had] seen him do and all that,
[Gilbert] couldn't believe that he came back.'"

R. 141.

Gilbert

pointed Zeb out for police, saying Zeb "was the guy who did it."
R. 141:131, 114.
certain" of this.

He also told police he was "a hundred percent
R. 141: 114.

Police surrounded Zeb's car,

drew their guns, made Zeb get out of the car and arrested him.
R. 141:114.
Terry Martinez ("Terry") was also with Rocky and Gilbert.
He did not see the stabbing, but thought that Zeb's mannerisms
after he returned to the scene feigned innocence.

Terry

testified that Zeb's "mannerisms ... seemed to present that he
was acting--was the notion, the impression that there was nothing
going on."

R. 141:175.

The marshaled evidence against Joseph from the first day of
6

trial was Gilbert's testimony that Joseph was present when
Gilbert saw Zeb hit Rocky in the neck, and testimony from Zeb's
good friend, Joshua Knox ("Joshua"), that Joseph was wearing a
bulletproof vest and possibly had a knife.

R. 141:137, 139.

Prosecutor: Did you--did--did you see [Joseph] holding
anything, that night?
Joshua: Well, I couldn't--I couldn't really be sure
but it looked like he was holding a knife when he was
sitting down by my T.V., but I can't — can't really say
'cause it was all covered up. I mean, I wasn't really
sure, so ...
R. 141:139.

Many of Joshua's friends carry knives, and although

Joshua did not see Zeb with a knife that night, Joshua did not
search Zeb, and Zeb might have had a knife on his person.
R. 141:144.

Joshua also testified that he was fairly close to

Zeb before Zeb got in the car and fled, and did not notice any
blood on Zeb.

R. 141:145.

The surgeon who treated Rocky also testified on the first
day of trial.

He testified that although Rocky's wound to the

neck was extensive, neither the carotid artery nor the jugular
veins were severed.

R. 141:188.

While massive bleeding occurs

when the carotid artery or jugular veins are severed, such
severance did not occur in this case.

R. 141:188.

The minute entry for the second day of trial shows that the
state called five witnesses on that day.

R. 77.

counsel with him and was one of those witnesses.

Zeb Smith had
R. 77.

Apparently, Zeb is the only witness who made statements
implicating Joseph.

The nuances of Zeb's testimony are critical

to a determination of whether sufficient evidence existed to
7

convict Joseph of the lesser offense of Aggravated Assault.
Given the unequivocal testimony from Gilbert that Zeb, not
Joseph, made contact with Rocky, and that Rocky immediately went
down and Zeb and Joseph left, the precise, transcribed testimony
by Zeb is critical to resolution of the meritorious insufficient
evidence claim which exists in this case.
A transcript of Zeb's precise testimony regarding statements
he attributed to Joseph is also necessary.

Zeb made inconsistent

statements to police officers and at the preliminary hearing
regarding statements that Joseph purportedly made to Zeb.
According to a pretrial memorandum filed by the state, Detective
Prior claimed that Zeb told him Joseph said, W I cut him."

R. 28.

At the preliminary hearing, however, Zeb denied making that
statement to Detective Prior and instead testified that Joseph
said, usomeone got stuck."

R. 28.

Because a transcript of Zeb's

testimony does not exist, the precise statement Zeb attributed to
Joseph at trial does not exist.

Nor does the cross-examination

regarding Zeb's inconsistencies exist.
Nine exhibits were identified and received the first day of
trial.

It is unclear from the record whether the state's

remaining exhibits were identified or received, or the context in
which they were introduced.
SUMMARY
The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's motion
for summary reversal and instead mandating that the parties and
trial court reconstruct the record.
8

While reconstruction may be

appropriate in some circumstances where only a minor portion of
the record is missing, or where the missing portions are fairly
straightforward, it is not appropriate where half of the trial,
covering a full day, is missing.
Petitioner's claim of insufficient evidence is fact specific
and depends on subtle nuances in the testimony.

Petitioner's

second docketed claim may also require a complete transcript.
Moreover, a potential claim regarding the state's request of a
lesser included instruction which is not a Serious Youth Offender
offense as well as the need for appellate counsel to review this
case to determine whether a claim of plain error or ineffective
assistance exists require a complete transcript.

Petitioner is

unable to fully exercise his state constitutional right to appeal
if required to work from a reconstructed record.

Additionally,

the Court of Appeals' requirement that the extensive portion of
the record which is missing be reconstructed is fundamentally
unfair.

Petitioner is treated differently from other defendants

similarly situated since he is required to rely on general
memories rather than a specific transcript of proceedings.

Given

the extensive portion of the transcript which is missing, the
importance of specific testimony rather than general memories to
this case, and the potential existence of undocketed issues,
reversal of the conviction is required in this case.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT. PETITIONER'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
APPEAL AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION ARE VIOLATED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS7 ORDER
DENYING SUMMARY REVERSAL AND INSTEAD REMANDING THE CASE
TO THE TRIAL COURT "FOR PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF XA
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE OR PROCEEDINGS' PURSUANT TO UTAH
R. APP. P. 11(g) WHERE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE
RECORD IS MISSING."
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a
constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction.
Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256.

This Court has recognized "that

the almost complete absence of a trial transcript makes appellate
review impossible because it precludes meaningful review of the
lower court's decision."

Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256 (citing

inter alia Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319-20 (Utah
1987); Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447; Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607,
608-09 (Utah 1976); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah
App. 1987)).

This Court has likewise recognized that "'criminal

defendants have the right to xa record of sufficient completeness
to permit proper consideration of [their] claims.'"

State v.

Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 241 (Utah 1992)(quoting Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499, 83 S.Ct. 774, 781, 9 L.Ed.2d 899
(1963)); see also City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d
513, 519 (Utah 1990)(Durham, J., dissenting)("contemporary
understanding of the concept of criminal appeals mandates at
least

review of convictions upon a record by a superior tribunal

for purposes of detecting procedural and evidentiary errors, as
well as constitutional ones'7) .
In Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447, this Court reversed a criminal
10

conviction because an incomplete transcript of voir

dire

precluded review of the defendant's claims regarding the adequacy
of the voir

dire.

As was the case in Taylor, adequate review of

Joseph's claims is impossible since the transcript of half the
trial is missing.

Moreover, appellate counsel in unable to

review the transcript for plain error.1
Article VIII, section 1, Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-56-105 (Supp. 1999) and J. Admin R. 4-201 require a district
court to make a record of its proceedings.

See Briggs, 740 P.2d

at 282. The failure to provide a record of the second day of
trial violates this statutory and constitutional requirement.
The statutory and Article VIII, section 1 requirement that
the district court make a record of all proceedings is critical
because "it is impossible for an appellate court to review what
may ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record
of them has been made."

Id.

While recognizing that "prejudicial

error can result from failure to make a complete record," this
Court upheld the trial court's order granting summary judgment in
Bricras only because it could glean from the record the facts
relevant to the isolated issue being raised.

By contrast, the

present case involves complete review of a criminal trial for
errors affecting the outcome, not review of an isolated summary
judgment claim.

1

In an unpublished order in State v. Rudolph, Case No.
950057 (September 21, 1995), this Court granted the defendant's
motion for summary reversal and vacated first degree felony
convictions under circumstances similar to the present case.
11

The complete review afforded Joseph includes a review for
plain error or ineffective assistance, as well as a review of the
issues docketed in the docketing statement, including the
meritorious claim that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to convict Joseph of Aggravated Assault.

Any attempts

at reconstruction of the record would preclude a review for plain
error or ineffective assistance; in all likelihood, if any such
error existed, trial counsel would not be aware of the error so
as to identify it in the reconstruction process.

Errors not

recognized or recalled by trial counsel would not appear in any
reconstructed record.

Whereas appellate counsel ordinarily

reviews a transcript for such error, that aspect of the review
made on appeal is not afforded Joseph under the Court of Appeals'
order.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of an accurate and complete transcript in order to
pursue an effective appeal.
277, 282 (1964)(stating

u

See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S.

[w]e conclude that this counsel's duty

cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony
and evidence presented by the prosecution"); Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 343, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 fn. 3
(1971)(listing cases in which "the Court has taken judicial
notice of the importance of a transcript in a variety of
circumstances"); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369, 89
S.Ct. 580, 582, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969)(recognizing that a
transcript rather than reliance on memory is required to
12

effectively pursue a request for a second hearing); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969)(indicating that misdemeanor
defendant's right to appeal is effectively denied, in violation
of equal protection, where he is not provided with a transcript
of the trial).
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that
a transcript is critical to appellate review, and have reversed
convictions where an adequate transcript is not available.

See

e.g. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Knox, 456 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1972); Parrott v.
United States, 314 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1963); Wester v. State, 368
So.2d 938 (Fla. App. 1979); Montford v. State, 298 S.E.2d 319
(Ga. App. 1982); State v. Perry, 381 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. App. 1985);
People v. Bricrqs, 557 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1990) .
The United States Supreme Court has also rejected the notion
that requiring a criminal defendant to rely on memory to
reconstruct the proceedings below adequately preserves the right
to appeal.

See Gardner, 393 U.S. at 369 (pointing out that

reliance on memory is not sufficient for review of trial court
proceedings); Britt, 4 04 U.S. at 434 (indicating that the Court
has "repeatedly rejected the suggestion that in order to render
effective assistance, counsel must have a perfect memory or keep
exhaustive notes of the testimony given at trial).

In rejecting

the claim that a state prisoner should rely on his memory of a
hearing rather than obtain a transcript, the Court stated:

13

Without a transcript the petitioner, as he prepared his
application to the appellate court, would have only his
lay memory of what transpired before the Superior
Court. For an effective presentation of his case he
would need the findings of the Superior Court and the
evidence that had been weighed and rejected in order to
present his case in the most favorable light.
Certainly a lawyer, accustomed to precise points of law
and nuances in testimony, would be lost without such a
transcript, save perhaps for the unusual and
exceptional case. The lawyer, having lost below, would
be conscious of the skepticism that prevails above when
a second hearing is sought and would as sorely need the
transcript in petitioning for a hearing before the
appellate court as he would if the merits of an appeal
were at stake. A layman hence needs the transcript
even more.
Gardner, 393 U.S. at 369 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
While Utah R. App. P. 11(g) provides a procedure that may be
utilized when a transcript is unavailable, that procedure is not
appropriate for this case.

The procedure is discretionary, as

evidenced by the use of the term "may."

Petitioner chose not to

utilize the procedure because any resulting record would not
adequately cover all of the details of the trial.

The state

agreed that a new trial was necessary, and stipulated to a new
trial rather than requesting that the parties attempt to
reconstruct the record.
Requiring parties to reconstruct the record, while
appropriate in circumstances where a minor part of the record is
missing or the testimony was straightforward, is not appropriate
in circumstances such as these where half of the trial is
missing, and subtle nuances in the testimony make or break
Joseph's claim that the state failed to prove its case.

Indeed,

this is not one of the "unusual or exceptional case [s]" (Gardner,
14

393 U.S. at 369) where a transcript is unnecessary.

Instead, a

transcript rather than more general memories is critical in order
to adequately review this conviction.
Appellant docketed two issues in the Court of Appeals:
A. Whether there was insufficient evidence for the
jury to convict Appellant of Aggravated Assault.
B. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find
that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the
case back to juvenile court.
The first issue, insufficient evidence, turns on subtle nuances
in the testimony.

Gilbert, the victim's close friend, was

standing next to Rocky when he was stabbed.
Zeb, not Petitioner, as the stabber.

Gilbert identified,

According to Gilbert, Zeb

took several swings at Rocky and hit Rocky in the neck.

Rocky

collapsed after being hit by Zeb, and no one made contact with
Rocky after that.

Gilbert testified that Joseph did not hit

Rocky.
Zeb, who was identified by Gilbert as the only person who
could have possibly stabbed Rocky, did not testify on the first
day of trial, and instead claimed the Fifth Amendment protection.
Moreover, the evidence on the first day of trial, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the state, failed to prove that
Joseph committed an aggravated assault.
Zeb's testimony on the second day of trial was apparently
the only testimony that even arguably suggested that Joseph was

15

in a position to stab Rocky.2

Zeb had previously been

inconsistent in statements to the officers and at preliminary
hearing regarding statements made by Joseph and Joseph's
purported role.

At trial, Zeb did not directly identify Joseph

as the stabber and instead made more subtle statements as to what
he claimed he saw Joseph do, and as to where Joseph was located
in relation to Rocky.

The state may remember those statements as

essentially "identifying" Joseph as the stabber whereas defense
counsel may remember those statements as not identifying Joseph
and instead simply indicating that Joseph was more involved in
the brawl than Gilbert had indicated.

The specific statements

made by Zeb when he testified, not the generalities remembered
eight months later in an attempt to reconstruct the record, are
critical for reviewing Joseph's claim of insufficient evidence.
Additionally, because Zeb made inconsistent statements
regarding statements attributed to Joseph and the incident
itself, cross-examination of Zeb regarding his inconsistencies
was an important aspect of this trial.

A review of the precise

questions and answers on cross-examination is critical not only
to a determination of whether the state presented sufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction, but also for a determination
as to whether those issues were adequately explored by defense
counsel.

An attempted reconstruction of the record based on a

2

While Joshua Knox thought Joseph might have been wearing
a bulletproof vest and maybe had a knife, this testimony did not
place Joseph at the scene nor indicate that Joseph had stabbed
Rocky.
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general memory of the nature of cross-examination deprives Joseph
of an adequate review of his insufficiency claim, and also
deprives him of a review of the cross-examination to ascertain
that defense counsel adequately explored the areas of
impeachment.
The second docketed issue involves a claim that after the
jury convicted Joseph of a form of aggravated assault which is
not a Serious Youth Offender offense, the district court judge
was required to remand the case to juvenile court.

The jury

instruction on aggravated assault reflected the elements of both
the second and third degree felony forms of aggravated assault.
While the second degree felony form of aggravated assault is a
Serious Youth Offender crime, the third degree felony form is
not.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(1)(a) (1996).

Because the

trial judge could not ascertain from the instruction which form
of aggravated assault was found by the jury, the judge imposed
conviction for the third degree felony.

While Appellant's

position is that the judge's finding is conclusive and supports
his argument that the case should have been remanded to the
juvenile court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(14) (1996)
since Joseph was not convicted of a Serious Youth Offender
offense over which the district court has jurisdiction, the state
and appellate court may desire a complete transcript of the trial
when reviewing this claim.
The incompleteness of the transcript raises other areas of
concern which cannot be adequately addressed by an attempted
17

reconstruction of the record.

For instance, the instructions

raise possible claims which cannot be adequately reviewed without
a complete record.
Attempted Murder.

The state originally charged Joseph with
The state relied on this charge as the basis

for binding Joseph over to adult court under the Serious Youth
Offender Act.

The state thereafter apparently requested a lesser

included instruction for an offense which would not have given
the district court jurisdiction over Joseph under the Serious
Youth Offender Act.

The propriety of such a request by the state

and the validity of the lesser conviction is an issue which
cannot be adequately explored under the existing record and which
may evade review if reconstruction is mandated.
It is also unclear from the existing record which of the
exhibits were actually admitted, or the import of the various
exhibits.

For instance, state's exhibits 20 and 21 show two

different photo arrays.

It is not clear whether those were

admitted, who they were shown to, or whether selections were
made.

State's exhibit 20 appears to be Zeb Smith (compare

picture in State's Exhibit 6 which was identified as Zeb Smith
(R. 141:117) with circled picture of state's exhibit 20). That
picture is circled and signed by Rocky Vigil, the victim in this
case, suggesting that Rocky selected Zeb as the perpetrator.
Any attempt at reconstruction would take a significant
amount of time since testimony of several witnesses,
clarification of the background and impact of various exhibits,
and reconsideration of all legal arguments would have to be made.
18

Because an entire half of the trial, covering a full day, is
missing, any attempt at reconstruction would not only take a long
time, but would also necessarily miss many of the details of the
trial.

The Court of Appeals' mandate that this case should be

remanded for reconstruction of the record is fundamentally
unfair, and deprives Joseph of his state constitutional right to
appeal since he will not receive a full review of the proceedings
if the order is upheld.

Moreover, Joseph's right to equal

protection is violated since other defendants in similar
circumstances are afforded a full review.

See Williams, 395 U.S.

458 (equal protection violation where defendant is not provided
with transcript of misdemeanor trial).
The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's motion
for summary reversal based on the incomplete record, as
stipulated to by the state.

Petitioner respectfully requests

that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari,
reverse the Court of Appeals order, and reverse his conviction.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that an attempted
reconstruction of this record would adequately preserve
Petitioner's right to appeal.

Because the appellate issues are

fact specific and based on nuances in the testimony, general
memories of what occurred fail to adequately preserve
Petitioner's right to appeal.

Additionally, reconstruction of

the record deprives Petitioner of the opportunity to have his
case reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of
19

counsel.

Reconstruction in all likelihood would take almost as

much time as retrying the case, and result in an inadequate
record.

Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that this

Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari, reverse the
Court of Appeals' order, and reverse his conviction for a new
trial.
DATED t h i s

Atf-Lt

d a y of December,

1999.

Clruu C <AMh/
JOAN C. WATT

Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

JOHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered ten copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court,
450 South State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140210, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114-0210, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this JL^LL day
of December, 1999.

CM* (. u^h/
JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah AttorneyGeneral 's Office as indicated above this
1999.

21
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Utah Court of Appeals

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

OCT 2 2 1393
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

V.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

Case No. 990647-CA
Priority No. 2

:

COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, JOSEPH P. TUNZI, by and
through counsel, JOAN C. WATT, and moves the Court pursuant to
Utah R. App. P. 10 and 2 to summarily reverse his conviction.
This motion is made on the following grounds, as set forth more
fully in the attached Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Reversal.
1.

A transcript of the proceedings for the second day of

trial does not exist.
2.

On the first day of trial, which was recorded and for

which a transcript exists, none of the witnesses identified
Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi as the person who stabbed the
victim.

In fact, the victim's friend, who was within a foot of

the victim when he was stabbed, identified Zebulin Smith as the
only person who hit the victim.

3.

On the second day of trial, five witnesses testified,

the defense made a motion for a directed verdict, the jury
instructions were read, and the parties gave closing arguments.
R. 77.
4.

Appellant's Article I, section 12 right to appeal is

violated by the absence of a transcript.
5.

Appellant did not learn of the missing transcript until

more than ten days after filing the docketing statement.
WHEREFORE, Appellant JOSEPH P. TUNZI respectfully requests
that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this *Z~JL day of October, 1999.

^^3>
JOAN C. WATT

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 32~JL day
of October, 1999.

Q k C>(M/

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this

day of October, 1999.

DELIVER® 3^
- Li

C.i

'G«3

!-P

V. LuP^ t,r
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FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

COURT OF APPEALS
ORDER OF REMAND
Case No. 990647-CA

v.
Joseph P. Tunzi,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on Tunzi1s motion for
summary reversal. He asks that we reverse the judgment against
him and order a new trial because the trial court cannot locate
the videotape of the second day of a two day trial.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is temporarily remanded
to the trial court for preparation and approval of "a statement
of evidence or proceedings" pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(g).
DATED this .^Q day of November, 1999.
FOR THE COURT:

f&n&Ct tO.ti&^A^
Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 30, 1999, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal
representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to
the party listed below:
JOHN D O'CONNELL, JR
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was handdelivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's
Office to be delivered to the party listed below:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
and
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this November 30, 1999.

By

~r-

S ±(

Deputy Clerk

W

Case No. 990647
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 981926150

ADDENDUM C

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Article I, Section 12

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Article VIII, Section 1

Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other
courts as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.

78-56-105. Record of court proceedings — Duties of court
reporter.
(1) The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for the means of maintaining
the record of proceedings in the courts of record by oflEdal court reporters or by
electronic recording devices.
(2) The official court reporter assigned to a session of court shall take full
verbatim stenographic notes of the session, except when the judge dispenses
with the verbatim record.
(3) The oflEdal court reporter shall immediately file with the clerk of the
court the original stenographic notes of the court session and the computer
disk on which the notes are stored. If not already on file with the clerk of the
court, the official court reporter shall file a computer disk containing the
reporter's most current dictionary showing the meaning of the reporter's
stenographic notes.
(4) Upon request and the payment of fees established by Section 78-56-108,
the oflEdal court reporter shall transcribe the stenographic notes or video or
audio recording of the court session and furnish the transcript to the requesting party.

78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure.
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges
any of the following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another,
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have
been a felony if committed by an adult.
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by
the Utah Supreme Court.
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and

held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist:
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than
the codefendants; and
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above conditions.
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the
information as though it were a juvenile petition.
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 20, Bail.
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound
over to the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the
charges in the district court.

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-201. Record of proceedings.
Intent:
To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceedings
in all courts of record.
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices.
To establish the procedure for requesting a transcript for a purpose other
than for an appeal.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Guidelines for court reporting methods. The official verbatim record of
court proceedings shall be maintained in accordance with the following
guidelines:
(A) Except as provided in this rule, a video recording system shall maintain
the official verbatim record of all District Court proceedings.
(B) An official court reporter or approved substitute court reporter shall
maintain the official verbatim record of District Court proceedings using real
time reporting methods in computer integrated courtrooms (CIO in the
following proceedings:
(i) all evidentiary hearings and trial proceedings and all phases of sentencing in capital felonies;
(ii) all evidentiary hearings after arraignment and trial proceedings in first
degree felonies; and
(iii) at the judge's discretion, subject to availability of a court reporter and
CIC equipment,
(a) in cases in which the judge finds that an appeal of the case is likely,
regardless of the outcome in the trial court;
(b) in cases in which the judge determines there is a substantial likelihood
a video recording would jeopardize the right to a fair trial or hearing; or
(c) in any other proceeding or portion of a proceeding, upon a showing of
good cause.
(C) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record of
all proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
(D)(i) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record
in proceedings of the district court in which the Judicial Council has previously
determined that the volume of cases in a courtroom is not sufficient to justify
the cost of installation of a video recording system.
(ii) An audio recording system may be used to maintain the official verbatim
record in any hearing in a small claims case.
(E) An audio recording system shall maintain the official verbatim record of
all proceedings in the juvenile court, except a juvenile court judge may use,
subject to availability, an official court reporter or a video recording system:
(i) if an appeal of the case is likely regardless of the outcome in the trial
court, or
(ii) in any other proceeding or portion of a proceeding, upon a showing of
good cause.
(F) When the judge determines that the privacy interests of the victim of a
crime, a party in a civil case or a witness outweigh the interest of the public in
access to a video record of the person, the judge may record the proceeding or

portion of the proceeding by use of a court reporter or an audio recording
system.
(G) Reporters shall be assigned to cover courtroom proceedings as set forth
above. In the event of a conflict in the request for an official court reporter, the
trial court executive or managing reporter shall confer with the presiding
judge, who shall resolve the conflict.
(H) A recording technology other than the presumed technology may be
used if the presumed technology is not available. The use of a technology other
than the presumed technology shall not form the basis of an issue on appeal.
(1) The Administrative Office shall periodically study the state of the art of
electronic recording technology and technology employed in computer integrated courtrooms and make recommendations to the Judicial Council of
systems to be approved.
(2) Operating and maintaining the electronic recording system.
(A) The clerk of the court or designee shall operate the electronic recording
system in the courtroom so as to record the proceedings before the court
accurately. The operator shall be trained in the operation of the system. A
separate log of each recorded proceeding shall be maintained on a form
approved by the Administrative Office.
(B) When a video recording system is used to maintain the official verbatim
record of court proceedings, at least two original recordings shall be made. One
original recording and log shall be filed with the clerk of the court as part of the
official court record. A second original recording shall be kept in a secure,
off-site storage area. The clerk of the court shall keep the original recording at
the courthouse in accordance with the record retention schedule. When an
audio recording system is used to maintain the official verbatim record of court
proceedings one original recording shall be made.
(C) If a proceeding is recorded by a court reporter, an electronic recording of
the proceeding shall not be made, except that a judge may direct a single
original of an electronic recording be made as part of the judge's notes for
personal use in the deliberative process under Section 63-2-103(18)(b)(ix).
(3) The official court record.
(A) In proceedings in which a video or audio recording system is used, the
court's original video or audio tape and accompanying log shall be the official
court record. In proceedings in which an official court reporter is used, the
reporter's shorthand notes shall be the official court record. The Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure govern the record on appeal.
(B) The official court record shall be filed with the clerk of the court.
(C) The clerk of the court shall be the custodian of the official court record
and may release the official court record only to a judge, the clerk of the
appellate court, the trial court executive, or the official court transcriber. The
clerk shall enter in the docket the name of the recipient and when the official
court record was released and returned. Obtaining a copy of the official court
record shall be governed by rules regulating access to court records.
(4) Requests for transcripts.
(A) A request for transcript for an appeal is governed by Utah R.App.P. 11
and Utah R.App.P. 12.
(B) A request for transcript for any purpose other than for an appeal shall
be accompanied by the fee established by Section 78-56-4 and filed with the
court executive. A request for an expedited transcript shall be accompanied by
the fee established by Section 78-56-4 and filed with the court executive. The
court executive shall assign the preparation of the transcript in the same
manner as Utah R.App.P. 12.
(Repealed and reenacted effective April 1, 1997; amended effective April 1,
1998.)
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JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

FILED
Uta* •->«»* of Appeals

JUL 11 1999
Julia D'Alssandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.
(1)

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Case No. 99
-CA
Priority No. 2

:

DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM:

June 9, 1999.
NATURE OF POSTJUDGMENT MOTION(S) PURSUANT TO RULES 50(a) OR
(b) , 52(b), 54(b), OR 59, UTAH R. CIV. P., OR RULES 24 OR 26,
UTAH R. CRIM. P., AND DATE(S) FILED:

None.

DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER(S) DISPOSING OF POSTJUDGMENT
MOTION(S):

Inapplicable.

DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL:
(2)

JURISDICTION:

July 8, 1999.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in

this matter pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district
4

court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final order for anything other than a first degree or
capital felony.

Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault,

a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103(1) (b) (Supp. 1998) .
(3)

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING:

This appeal is from a final

judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton
presiding.
(4)

STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED:
On November 1, 1998, at 2817 South Alden Street, John R.
Vigil ("Vigil") was hot-tubbing with some friends.

One of those

friends, Gilbert Leyba ("Leyba") started to talk to some girls
that were from a party across the street.

Two individuals,

identified as the defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Joseph" or
"Appellant") and his cousin Zebulin Smith ("Zeb"), approached and
confronted Vigil and Leyba.

Words were exchanged.

and Zeb were standing in front of Vigil.

Vigil was suddenly hit

a couple of times and stabbed in the neck.
both Joseph and Zeb fled in a vehicle.
returned to the scene and was arrested.

Both Joseph

After the assault,

Later that night, Zeb
Leyba told the officers

that arrested Zeb that he was one hundred percent positive that
Zeb was the person who stabbed Vigil.
Zeb testified at trial that he did not stab anyone.

He said

that as he was walking away from the confrontation, he saw out of
the corner of his eye Joseph hit Vigil.

He also stated that

later that night, Joseph said he had stabbed someone.

Other than

Zeb, no one testified that they saw Joseph hit or stab Vigil.
2

On April 23, 1999, Appellant, who was a juvenile when the
offense was committed, was tried as an adult under the serious
youth offender statute.

The jury returned a verdict of not

guilty to Attempted Murder and a verdict of guilty to the lesser
included count of Aggravated Assault. The verdict form did not
indicate whether the Aggravated Assault was a second or a third
degree felony.
On June 9, 1999, Appellant made a motion for a new trial
based on the vague verdict form.

The court denied the motion but

ruled that the conviction was on the third degree felony.
Appellant then made a motion that the court had lost jurisdiction
under the serious youth offender statute and that the case should
be remanded to the juvenile court.

The court denied that motion

and sentenced Appellant to prison.
(5)

ISSUE (S) PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL AND APPLICABLE

STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW:
A.

Whether there was insufficient evidence for the

jury to convict Appellant of Aggravated Assault.
Standard of Review: In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we view the evidence and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict. See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah
1993) .
B.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to find

that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the case
back to the juvenile court.
Standard of Review: This is an issue of statutory
construction, and therefor is a question of law reviewable
under a correctness standard. See State v. Hudeceh, 965
P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1998).
3

(6)

DETERMINATIVE LAW:
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 951 (Utah 1993);
State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1998);
State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (Supp. 1998);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) ;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996).

(7) RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS: None.
ATTACHMENTS:

Sentence, Judgment, Commitment; Notice of

Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31

day of July, 1999.

ypOEN O'CONNELL, JR.
^Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOHN O'CONNELL, JR., hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Utah Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854,
this X.Z~JL day of July, 1999.

Qjac^

rOHN O'CONNELL, JR.

DELIVERED this 2^-

day of July, 1999.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 981926150 FS

JOSEPH P TUNZI,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S ATHERTON
June 9, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
chrisc
Prosecutor: FRED BERMESTER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : JOHN OCfCONNELL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 13, 1981
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 10.15
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/26/1999 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony/ the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Commitment is to begin immediately.

PaCTP 1

Case No: 981926150
Date:
Jun 09, 1999

SENTENCE FINE
Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$2297.30
$5000.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Amount Due:

$5000.00
$0
$2297.30
$5000.00

Charge # 1

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $150.00
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Pay fine to The Court.
Dated this _J

day of

a

XMsL.

"n-a/^rei

O

Mz*C»f-\

JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

Case No. 981926150FS

Defendant/Appellant

HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JOSEPH P. TUNZI, Defendant/
Appellant in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the
Utah Court of Appeals from the final judgment rendered against
him on the 9th day of June, 1999, by the Honorable Judith S.
Atherton, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this 2tL

day of July, 1999.

M/

OHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOHN O'CONNELL, JR., hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East
300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854, this

#&*

day of July, 1999.

HN OrCONNELL, JR.

DELIVERED this 3.

day of July, 1999

m
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ADDENDUM E

JT

tf

LAURA B. DUPAIX - #5195
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM, #1231
Utah Attorney General
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorneys for PlaintifffAppellee

I IN J HI', I I AH i niiR'l Ml M T I

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH p. TUNZI

US

MOTION, STIPULATION AND ORDER
FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR
STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL
Case No. 990647-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

Appellee, by and through its counsel, Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General,
MU)M:S

tin,

C{)UT\

lor u !*wi;i\ enl;in.'rnicni ol'limt. unhin which in file iis response to

appellant^ Motion for Summary Reversal. The reason for this motion is that appellant seeks
a reversal because part of the record is missing. The Sta.te would like additional time to try to
tind the missing pail nl I he ia mil < ounscl lor .ippelljuit has Mipulaleil lo this extension of
time.
DATED this

5 ^

day of November, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
C
fefcfcV
.AURA B. DUPAIX
Assistant Attorney General

LAURA B. DUPAIX - #5195
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM, #1231
Utah Attorney General
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSEPH P. TUNZI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

STIPULATION FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME FOR STATE'S RESPONSE
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
REVERSAL

Case No. 990647-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JOAN C. WATT, counsel for appellant, Joseph P. Tunzi and LAURA B. DUPAIX,
Assistant Attorney General, hereby stipulate that the State may have a 15-day enlargement
of time in which to submit its response to appellant's Motion for Summary Reversal.
Appellee's response is due on November 5, 1999. Appellee's brief will now be due on
November 20, 1999.
Dated this

CJM^J^U
JOAN C. WATT
Counsel for Kalmar

day of

AWw,^i

, 1999.

LilUffa
U

^/LAURA B. DUPAL
Assistant Attorney General

ADDENDUM F

/

LAURA B. DUPADC - #5195
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM, #1231
Utah Attorney General
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT Oh APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH P. TUNZI,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:
:
:

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL
Case No. 990647-1 A
Priority No. 2

:

The State of Utah, through its counsel Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General,
does not oppose appellant's motion for summary reversal and remand for a new trial on the
ground that a transcript ol the seiond <\u\ ol trial is unavailable Because appellant is
asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, the absence of a transcript
for a full day of the two-day trial makes appellate review and reconstruction of the record
difficult, if not impossible. See State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255,1256 (Utah 1996); State

v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 446-47 (Utah 1983). It appears, therefore, that to preserve
appellant's state constitutional right to an appeal, the appropriate remedy is a new trial. See
Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256; Taylor, 664 P.2d at 446-47.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?'

day of

A/gl/dW^

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

<a^jO~J~>f*f?6U&
lURA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

2

. 1999.

MAILING CERTIFICA I 1
I hereby ecrtih thai on Ihis '^^dav of Jlfk^^i^Y'

, 1999,1 mailed,

postage prepaid, an accurate copy of the foregoing State's response to the following:
Joan C. Watt
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Courtesy Copy t<>
Fred Burmester
Deputy District Attorney
SALT DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
231 East 400 South, Lower Level
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
-7-)

